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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
MATi 01 ; HI AH
Plaintiff-Appellee,

Case No. 940523-CA

v.
DUKE G. DUCCINI,

Priority No. 2

Defendant-Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE Ul i m PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals from a conviction for theft, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. §76-6-404(1990), inthe Second Judicial District Cum t Wi-bci« ouni\, (in: I iuuorable
Michael J. Glasmann presiding. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(f)
(Supp. 1994).
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Question: Can this Court review a pretrial suppression ruling where the only evidence adduced
in the suppression lica II NJ.1 .i tianscnpl nt ddntdaiil s police interview is noi pail of the record
on appeal?
Standard of review1 VVIiur \m appellani t/nk lo pm\n|i' m M.lci|iiate record un appeal,
the reviewing court presumes the regularity of proceedings below. Call v. City of West Jordan.
788 P.2d 1049, 1053, cert, denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah App. 1990); State v. Linden. 761 P 2d
13K6, 1188 (Huh rW8,i <prr curiam) (jury voir dire recorded but not transcribed).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES
Applicable provisions are reproduced in the addendum.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged by information dated 1 December 1993 with theft of property exceeding
$1,000 in value, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1990) (R.
1). Defendant pled not guilty by reason of insanity (R. 32-33). At a competency hearing on
26 January 1994, the district court found that defendant was not competent to stand trial at that
time and committed him to the Utah State Hospital (R. 44).
Some two months later the Utah State Hospital Clinical Director certified that defendant
was competent to stand trial (R. 46) and the district court ordered his release to the county sheriff
(R. 45). The district court remanded the case to the circuit court for a preliminary hearing, and
defendant was bound over (R. 28, 50). He entered a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity
(R. 56-57).
Defendant moved to suppress his confession (R. 66-67,71-95). After a suppression hearing,
the court denied this motion (R. 120, 129, 463). On 28 June 1994, after a two-day trial, a jury
found defendant guilty and mentally ill (R. 130). He was sentenced to the statutory prison term
(R. 132). He timely appealed (R. 135).
STATEMENT OF FACTS1
On 26 November 1993, defendant stole a 16-foot flatbed trailer valued in excess of $1500,
together with some scaffolding, from a South Ogden construction site. The owner was Rickie

1

Except as otherwise noted, record facts are stated "in the light most favorable to the jury's
verdict." State v. Verde. 770 P.2d 116, 117 (Utah 1989).
2

Wright, a brick contractor (R. 164-70). Defendant transported Wright's trailer to the home of
his friend Charles Brown (R. 221, 224). He represented to Brown that the trailer was not stolen
and asked Bmv n lo pa ml ii lm him. which Brown did (R. 172, 221-22, 244).
Several days later Detective Roger Hunt apprehended defendant at the Orleans Motel (R.
228). Hunt informed defendant of ins Miranda rights,

VUIRII

he wmwd ill*1 ?.M)\ l i u l ;ii (he

police station, Hunt questioned defendant on tape for over half an hour (R. 232-33). Defendant
gave various conflicting explanations for the trailer's disappearance, although lie did not deny
removing it from the construction site (R. 233-37,243). In the interview, defendant never claimed
that someone paid him $50 to move the trailer (R. 234), a theory he advanced at trial through
hi* wife (R. 295).
In January 1994, Rhett Potter, a licensed social worker, examined defendant and opined

attention deficit disorder; and that his intelligence was limited (R. 87). Also, Harvey Wheelwright,
a psychiatrist, opined that defendant had a mental illness of a complicated nature; thai his basic
problem was severe attention deficit disorder and severe dyslexia; and that he had developed a
"schizophrenic disorder of the paranoid type," including auditory hallucinations i

n

In March 1994, Peter Heinbecker, a psychiatrist and lawyer at the Utah State Hospital, reported
that defendant had been placed on medications and opined that he was competent to stand trial

3

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant filed a motion to suppress incriminating statements he made to police. After
reviewing a transcription of the police interrogation, the district court held a hearing at which
it received arguments of counsel, but no additional evidence. Based on the contents of the transcript
and on Colorado v. Connelly. 479 U.S. 157 (1986), the district court refused to suppress. Defendant
attacks this ruling. However, he has not made the transcribed police interview a part of the record
on appeal. This Court must therefore presume the regularity of the proceedings below, arid affirm.
Defendant's claim has no merit in any event. Although he has established some degree of
mental illness, he has failed to demonstrate that the police interrogation was coercive. Since the
voluntariness of a confession under the Due Process Clause "has always depended on the absence
of police overreaching, not on 'free choice' in any broader sense of the word," id. at 170, defendant
has not demonstrated that his incriminating statements were given involuntarily here.
ARGUMENT
BECAUSE DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO INCLUDE IN THE RECORD THE
TRANSCRIPT OF HIS INTERROGATION, THIS COURT MUST PRESUME
THAT THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO SUPPRESS IT
Defendant challenges the district court's refusal to suppress incriminating statements
made during police interrogation. Br. of Appellant at 7. His brief, which cites neither the
United States nor the Utah constitution, is unclear about the precise legal grounds for his
challenge. However, he cites Colorado v. Connelly. 479 U.S. 157 (1986) and State v.
Singer. 815 P.2d 1303 (Utah App. 1991), Br. of Appellant at 7, 10, both of which rest
solely on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See 479 U.S. at 163; 815

4

P.2d at 1309. The State therefore proceeds on the assumption that defendant claims no other
legal grounds for his challenge. This ground was preserved below (R. 463 at 8-9).2
A. In the absence of crucial evidence, this Court must presume the district
court acted properly.
Because the record on appeal does not contain the interview transcript upon which the
district court's ruling was based, this Court must affirm.
Defendant moved to suppress incriminating statements made in the course of a police
interview, which had been tape-recorded and transcribed (see R. 112). The transcription
apparently ran to over 30 pages (R. 463 at 12). Counsel argued based on this transcription
(id. at 3, 7). No live testimony was introduced at the suppression hearing, nor were any
exhibits admitted (id. at 2). It is apparent from the transcript of the suppression hearing that
the court was familiar with the transcribed interview (id. at 6, 17). Indeed, the trial judge
expressly relied on it in finding that the police interrogation was not coercive, finding that
defendant's statements were given voluntarily, and thus denying defendant's motion to
suppress (id. at 17-18).
However, defendant never moved to admit the transcript below and it does not appear
in the record on appeal. Without this transcription, this Court cannot review the district
court's conclusion that police questioning was not coercive. Consequently, it must affirm.
Rule 11(e)(2), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, requires the appellant to include in
the record a transcript of all evidence relevant to any finding or conclusion appellant claims

2

However, Brief of Appellant does not comply with rule 24(a)(5), Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
5

is unsupported by or is contrary to the evidence. "In essence, Rule 11 directs counsel to
provide this Court with all evidence relevant to the issues raised on appeal." Sampson v.
Richins. 770 P.2d 998, 1002 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 116 P.2d 916 (Utah 1989). Where
an appellant fails to provide an adequate record on appeal, the reviewing court presumes the
regularity of proceedings below. Call v. Citv of West Jordan. 788 P.2d 1049, 1053 (Utah
App.), cert, denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990); State v. Linden. 761 P.2d 1386, 1388
(Utah 1988) (per curiam) (Jury vou " dire recorded but not transcribed).
The burden to ensure that the record contains the materials necessary to support an
appeal rests with the appellant. State v. Linden. 761 P.2d at 1388; State v. Theison. 709
P.2d 307, 309 (Utah 1985). An appellate court will not "speculate on the existence of facts
that do not appear in the record." Id. "When crucial matters are not included in the record,
the missing portions are presumed to support the action of the trial court." JjL See also
Jolivet v. Cook. 784 P.2d 1148, 1150 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 1033 (1990);
State v. Miller. 718 P.2d 403, 405 (Utah 1986); State v. Robbins. 709 P.2d 771, 773 (Utah
1985); State v. Mitchell, 671 P.2d 213, 215 (Utah 1983); State v. Jones. 657 P.2d 1263,
1267 (Utah 1982).

"Absent that recordf.J defendant's assignment of error stands as a

unilateral allegation which the review court has no power to determine. This Court simply
cannot rule on a question which depends for its existence upon alleged facts unsupported by
the record." State v. Wetzel. 868 P.2d 64, 67 (Utah 1993) (quoting State v. Barella. 714
P.2d 287, 288 (Utah 1986) (in turn quoting State v. Wulffenstein. 657 P.2d 289, 293 (Utah
1982), cert, denied, 460 U.S. 1044 (1983))). Moreover, "[n]either the court nor the appellee

6

is obligated to correct appellant's deficiencies in providing the relevant portions of the
transcript." Utah R. App. P. 11(e)(2).
The trial transcript is before this Court. And, at trial the interviewing officer did quote,
summarize, and describe parts of the transcribed interview {see generally R. 232-53). He
also testified as to defendant's "body language" and "demeanor" (R. 253). Therefore, the
evidence presented at trial was both over-inclusive and under-inclusive of the evidence
presented at the suppression hearing in the form of the transcribed interview.
Nor did defendant renew his motion to suppress at trial. Had he done so, it would be
proper for this Court to review the trial transcript. Instead, defendant asks this Court to
review the suppression ruling on the basis of the bits and pieces of the transcription that the
parties happened to introduce through witnesses at trial. There is no guarantee that the
portions of the transcript the district judge considered decisive were ever introduced at trial.
Although Utah has no rule, most appellate courts, in reviewing the denial of a pretrial
motion to suppress evidence, will consider only evidence before the court at the suppression
hearing. See, e.g., United States v. Hicks. 978 F.2d 722, 724-25 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Baez v.
State. 425 S.E.2d 885, 890 (Ga. App. 1992); State v. Rvder. 315 N.W.2d 786, 788-89
(Iowa 1982); Aiken v. State. 647 A.2d 1229, 1232 (Md. App. 1994), cert, denied, 651 A.2d
854 (Md. 1995); Commonwealth v. Powers. 398 A.2d 1013, 1014 (Pa. 1979); 4 Wayne R.
LaFave, Search and Seizure § 11.1(c) (1987).3

3

However, renewal of a pretrial motion at trial may expand the scope of appellate review
to evidence presented at trial. See, e.g., State v. Derr. 451 S.E.2d 731, 740 n.6 (W.V. 1994);
4 LaFave; supra. See also United States v. Martin. 982 F.2d 1236, 1241 (8th Cir. 1993) (trial
(continued...)

7

Some appellate courts will consider both pretrial and trial evidence in reviewing a
pretrial ruling. However, courts endorsing this rule generally do so in the context of
affirming the trial court's pretrial ruling. United States v. Muniz. 1 F.3d 1018, 1021-22
(10th Cir.), cert, denied, 114 S. Ct. 575 (1993); United States v. Martin. 982 F.2d 1236,
1239-40 n.2 (8th Cir. 1993); United States v. Basev. 816 F.2d 980, 983 n.l (5th Cir. 1987);
State v. Young. 576 So.2d 1048, 1054 n.l, 1055 (La. Ct. App. 1991); State v. Duncan. 879
S.W.2d 749, 751 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994). Contra State v. Kong. 883 P.2d 686, 688 (Hawaii
Ct. App. 1994) (reversal).
The principle unifying these cases is that an appellate court may affirm, but will not
reverse, a ruling based on evidence not before the district court at the time it ruled.
However, the State is aware of no jurisdiction following the rule defendant tacitly urges, that
an appellate court may reverse a pretrial ruling based only oh evidence presented at trial
without considering evidence presented at the pretrial hearing.
Because defendant did not renew his motion to suppress at trial, this Court should not
consider trial testimony in reviewing the court's pretrial order. However, even if this Court
were inclined to include trial testimony within its review, it would still be improper to rely
solely on trial testimony in testing a ruling that was made solely on the basis of a
transcription of defendant's interview.

3

(...continued)
objection necessary to preserve issue of discrepancy between witness's testimony at trial and at
suppression hearing); Writtv. State. 541S. W.2d 424,426 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (if no evidence
was submitted on the pretrial motion, renewal of motion at trial is necessary to preserve issue
on appeal); Wells v. Commonwealth. 371 S.E.2d 19, 22 (Va. Ct. App. 1988) (where motion
to suppress was renewed at close of trial, appellate court may consider entire record).
8

Consequently, in the absence of crucial portions of the record, this Court should
presume the correctness of the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress.
B. Available evidence supports the district court's ruling in any event.
To review the district court's ruling based solely upon the trial transcript would be
futile and unjust. But even such a review would confirm that the trial judge's ruling was
correct.
Based upon its review of the transcribed interview, and citing Colorado v. Connelly,
479 U.S. 157 (1986), the district court found that the police interrogation was not coercive
and, accordingly, refused to suppress defendant's incriminating statement notwithstanding his
mental problems (R. 463 at 18).
Colorado v. Connelly clearly controls. That case involved a defendant who was
"suffering from chronic schizophrenia and was in a psychotic state" the day before he
confessed. 479 U.S. at 161. A psychiatrist employed by the state hospital testified that the
defendant's "command hallucinations" interfered with his "volitional abilities" and that his
"psychosis motivate his confession." Id. at 161-62. The Colorado Supreme Court, holding
that "the proper test for admissibility is whether the statements are 'the product of a rational
intellect and a free will,'" id. at 162, affirmed suppression.
However, the United States Supreme Court observed that "[t]he purpose of excluding
evidence seized in violation of the Constitution is to substantially deter future violations of
the Constitution." Id. at 166. Accordingly, it held that "coercive police activity is a
necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not 'voluntary' within the meaning of
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 167. "The voluntariness of a
9

waiver of this [Fifth Amendment] privilege," the Court continued, "has always depended on
the absence of police overreaching, not on 'free choice' in any broader sense of the word."
Id. at 170.4
This Court followed Connelly in State v. Singer. 815 P.2d 1303 (Utah App. 1991).
Singer claimed that his interrogation was not "inherently coercive," but that "federal agents
used a subtle form of coercion, to which he was particularly vulnerable" due to his "peculiar
personal characteristics," including clinical depression, lack of socialization, and extreme
gullibility. Id. at 1309-10. This Court rejected his argument, stating, "The United States
Supreme Court in Colorado v. Connelly, eschewed a 'free will' analysis of voluntariness of
confessions. The Court stated that the sole concern underlying the Fifth Amendment is
coercive tactics by government agents." Id. at 1310 (citation omitted).
The heart of defendant's claim is that, while the officer's interrogation was not
inherently coercive, it had the effect of extracting incriminating statements from defendant
because of his mental condition. At the motion to suppress, counsel argued that while the
interviewing officer's technique "may not be flat out threats or flat out coercion in the sense
that he is telling him that he is going to charge him with something more serious, or
anything like that. But based upon Mr. Duccini's mental condition at the time, I think that
could very easily be construed . . . to be coercive" (R. 463 at 8). This is precisely the

4

However, "the fact that the police interview was coercive [is] not enough, by itself, to render
the defendant's confession involuntary. To be involuntary, there must be a causal relationship
between the coercion and the subsequent confession." State v. Mabe. 864 P.2d 890, 893 (Utah
1993).

10

argument rejected by the United States Supreme Court and this Court in Connelly and
Singer, respectively.
Nor has defendant demonstrated "coercive tactics by government agents." His brief
claims that the interview was coercive because "Detective Hunt changed his form of
questioning to stating facts, and asking the Defendant if each fact was not true." Br. of
Appellant at 8-9. Yet the only passage in the record cited for this assertion does not support
it (see R. 266-67). Moreover, defendant cites no authority to the effect that an interrogation
that employs leading questions is coercive, and the State knows of none. Cf. People v. Cox.
270 Cal. Rptr. 730, 733 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) ("The fact that the questions were somewhat
leading does not equate to a conclusion that they were coercive.").
Defendant also claims, "If Detective Hunt did not receive the affirmation to the question
that he desired he would try to argue with the Defendant with a view of causing him to
affirm the question he was asking." Br. of Appellant at 8-9. Again, defendant cites only a
single page for what he implies was a repeated questioning technique, and even that one page
does not support his claim (see R. 250).
Finally, the interrogating officer had no reason to believe that defendant was incapable
of speaking lucidly and voluntarily. Although at one point defendant stated he was on ritalin
(R. 245), the officer testified that he showed no external signs of mental illness, "seemed
fine," and "had no problems with the questions I was asking him" (R. 241, 268, 275). It
never occurred to the officer that defendant "was having a problem with competence . . . as
far as his ability to talk . . . on a voluntary basis" (R. 268-69). There was no coercion here.
Defendant's claim lacks merit.
11

CONCLUSION
Defendant's conviction should be affirmed.

ORAL ARGUMENT NOT REQUESTED
Because the facts and legal arguments are adequately presented in the briefs, oral
argument would not significantly aid the Court in deciding this case.
RESPECTFULLY submitted ort3, /February 1995.
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

FREDERIC VOROS, JR.
stant Attorney General
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TONY B. MILES
2568 Washington Blvd., Suite 202
Ogden, Utah
Attorney for Appellant
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1990). Theft.
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over
the property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412. Theft - Classification of offenses - Action for
treble damages against receiver of stolen property.
(1) Theft of property and services as provided in this chapter shall be
punishable:
(a) as a felony of the second degree if the:
(i) value of the property or services exceeds $1,000; . . .

ADDENDUM B

Rule 11(e). The record on appeal.
(e) The transcript of proceedings; duty of appellant to order; notice to
appellee if partial transcript is ordered.
(2) Transcript required of all evidence regarding challenged finding
or conclusion. If the appellant intends to urge on appeal that a finding or
conclusion is unsupported by or is contrary to the evidence, the appellant shall
include in the record a transcript of all evidence relevant to such finding or
conclusion. Neither the court nor the appellee is obligated to correct
appellant's deficiencies in providing the relevant portions of the transcript.

ADDENDUM C

.. . . :

GARY R. HEWARD, UBN 5085
DEPUTY WEBER COUNTY ATTORNEY
WEBER COUNTY ATTORNEYS OFFICE
7TH FLOOR MUNICIPAL BUILDING
OGDEN, UTAH 84401
TELEPHONE: 399-8377
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SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

:
:

FINDINGS AND ORDER

:

Criminal No. 931900^64

:

Judge Michael J. Glasmann

JUN2 9 1994
DUKE G. DUCCINI,
Defendant.

The Court having reviewed the Memorandums submitted by counsel for defendant and the State
of Utah, and after hearing the arguments presented by both sides this date, hereby finds and rules as
follows:
The State of Utah has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the statement taken from
defendant on November 29, 1993 by Detective Roger Hunt, South Ogden Police Department, was
voluntarily given by defendant.
THEREFORE,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS SAID STATEMENT IS
DENIED.
DATED this 17th day of June, 1994.

